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THE JURISPRUDENTIAL TURN 
IN LEGAL ETHICS  
Katherine R. Kruse
* 
When legal ethics developed as an academic discipline in the mid-1970s, its 
theoretical roots were in moral philosophy.
 
The early theorists in legal ethics were 
moral philosophers by training, and they explored legal ethics as a branch of 
moral philosophy. From the vantage point of moral philosophy, lawyers’ 
professional duties comprised a system of moral duties that governed lawyers in 
their professional lives, a ―role-morality‖ for lawyers that competed with ordinary 
moral duties. In defining this ―role-morality,‖ the moral philosophers accepted the 
premise that ―good lawyers‖ are professionally obligated to pursue the interests 
of their clients all the way to the arguable limits of the law, even when doing so 
would harm third persons or undermine the public good. More recent scholarship 
in legal ethics has rejected the moral philosophers’ premise that lawyers’ ethical 
duties demand instrumentalist partisan interpretation of the ―bounds of the law.‖ 
In what I call the ―jurisprudential turn‖ in legal ethics, legal scholars are now 
increasingly looking to jurisprudential and political theory to explore the 
interpretive stance that it is appropriate for lawyers to take with respect to the 
―bounds of the law‖ that limit their partisan advocacy. Just as jurisprudential 
theories of adjudication ground judges’ duties of legal interpretation in the role of 
judges in a democratic society, jurisprudential theories of lawyering ground 
lawyers’ interpretive duties in analysis of the role lawyers play in a democratic 
system of government. This Article critically examines the emerging uses of 
jurisprudential theory in legal ethics. It argues that jurisprudential theory presents 
an attractive alternative to moral theory in legal ethics because it provides a 
rubric for limiting lawyers’ no-holds-barred partisan manipulation of law that 
springs directly from the lawyer’s professional duties rather than competing with 
them. It critiques the two major schools of thought in the ―jurisprudence of 
lawyering,‖ based on Dworkian and positivist jurisprudence. And it questions the 
common framework within each jurisprudential school, which assigns lawyers a 
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role as case-by-case lawmakers, suggesting that this framework imposes an 
inappropriately lawyer-centered focus on assessments of the legitimacy of law that 
more properly belong to clients. 
INTRODUCTION 
Clients come to lawyers to find out what the law requires, prohibits, or 
allows them to do. However, the limits of the law are often unclear, and lawyers 
must exercise professional judgment in choosing how to explain the law to their 
clients. Legal ethicists have recently begun to debate the contours of lawyers‘ 
jurisprudential duties when counseling clients, grappling in the process with how 
to apply jurisprudential theory about the relationship between law and morality to 
the tasks of lawyering.
1
 This ―jurisprudential turn‖ in legal ethics is based on the 
premise that in counseling and advising their clients, lawyers are not merely 
transmitting information about law but are playing a quasi-official role in shaping 
the ―bounds of the law‖ within which their clients operate.2 Although each lawyer–
client consultation affects the life and affairs of only one client, legal ethicists 
argue, the aggregate of these consultations determines the shape of law as it exists 
in society.
3
 Lawyers thus play a lawmaking or law-interpreting role that is 
different from, but no less important than, the role that legislatures and judges play 
in creating and interpreting law. 
Consider Stephen Pepper‘s example of a lawyer counseling a 
manufacturing plant about the effect of environmental regulations that prohibit 
discharge of ammonia into the ground water in amounts greater than 0.050 grams 
per liter.
4
 Should the lawyer inform the client that violations of less than 0.075 per 
liter will be ignored by the EPA? Or that first-time violations of less than 1.5 
                                                                                                                
    1. Recent exploration of the jurisprudence of lawyering can be found in 
WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE (1998); TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF 
ROGUES?: A DEFENCE OF THE STANDARD CONCEPTION OF THE LAWYER‘S ROLE (2009); and 
W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010). See also DAVID LUBAN, 
Natural Law as Professional Ethics: A Reading of Fuller, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN 
DIGNITY 99 (2007) [hereinafter HUMAN DIGNITY] (reading Lon Fuller‘s jurisprudence about 
lawmaking as inclusive of the work of legislators, judges, and lawyers). 
    2. See generally W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 
NW. U. L. REV. 1167 (2005). See also DAVID LUBAN, A Different Nightmare and a Different 
Dream, in HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 131, 131 (describing lawyer–client 
consultations as a ―the primary point of intersection between ‗The Law‘ and the people it 
governs, the point at which the law in books becomes the law in action‖). 
    3. LUBAN, supra note 2, at 145–52; Wendel, supra note 2, at 1172; David B. 
Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 476–78 (1990). 
    4. This example was presented by Pepper as a moral problem in his classic 
defense of traditional partisan legal ethics. Stephen Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical 
Role: A Defense, A Problem and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 627–
28 [hereinafter Pepper, Lawyer’s Amoral Role]. It was discussed again in the context of a 
range of examples of counseling clients about enforcement or remedies in Stephen L. 
Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of 
Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1550–52 (1995) [hereinafter Pepper, Counseling at the 
Limits]. 
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grams per liter will result in only a warning?
5
 Whether the lawyer acknowledges it 
or not, in choosing to include or exclude enforcement information, the lawyer has 
taken a jurisprudential stand on whether such enforcement practices are written 
into the ―bounds of the law‖ within which clients are entitled to operate. Lawyers‘ 
jurisprudential stands on these issues also affect law‘s reach in society. If lawyers 
in an industry regularly advise clients about the limits of administrative 
enforcement, the practical effect of the law in society will mirror the limits of its 
enforcement rather than its intended scope. 
Jurisprudential issues are also implicated when lawyers decide whether to 
seek out or take advantage of ―loopholes‖ in the law, interpretations that comply 
technically with the letter of the law but violate the law‘s spirit or purpose. Enron‘s 
―creative and aggressive‖ approach to interpreting permissible accounting 
practices under securities regulations contravened regulatory purposes and 
eventually led to the company‘s financial collapse.6 The Bush administration‘s 
legal justifications for the use of interrogation tactics such as beatings, 
waterboarding, sexual humiliation, and sleep deprivation relied on interpretations 
of language prohibiting torture that ignored its history and context and stretched its 
conventional legal meaning.
7
 The lawyers in these cases ―made law‖ by providing 
legal opinions that guided their clients‘ actions. Yet, unlike public and reviewable 
judicial opinions, the lawyers‘ interpretations of law were communicated in the 
privacy of the lawyer–client relationship without the accountability of public 
oversight. 
Legal ethicists have long recognized that the choices lawyers make in 
characterizing the law to their clients have jurisprudential implications,
8
 but have 
only recently focused attention on theoretical analysis of lawyers‘ duties to 
interpret the law correctly or appropriately. This Article maps the emerging 
―jurisprudence of lawyering‖ and raises questions about its current direction. Part I 
sets the stage for the jurisprudential turn in legal ethics by describing the 
implicit—though ethically problematic—jurisprudence of practicing lawyers, 
which legal ethicists recognize as being based on a legal realist conception of law 
as prediction of official behavior. When applied to legal ethics, the legal realist 
conception of law is problematic because it deprives law of the capacity to set 
normative limits on legal representation and encourages lawyers to view the 
―bounds of the law‖ that are supposed to constrain their partisan pursuit of their 
clients‘ interests from the perspective of a Holmesian ―bad man.‖ 
Taking this implicit jurisprudence as a given, early legal ethicists argued 
that lawyers have a professional duty to limit the pursuit of their clients‘ objectives 
on moral grounds, and legal ethics debates came to center around how robust a 
                                                                                                                
    5. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits, supra note 4, at 1551. 
    6. Wendel, supra note 2, at 1170–71. 
    7. W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 
CORNELL L. REV. 67, 81 (2005). 
    8. See generally Pepper, Counseling at the Limits, supra note 4; William H. 
Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. 
L. REV. 29. 
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role lawyers‘ moral judgments ought to play in shaping legal representation.9 Both 
critics and defenders of the legal realist jurisprudence agreed that lawyers have a 
professional duty to bring their moral influence to bear on clients, differing 
primarily on questions of how strongly and in what circumstances moral 
counseling is required. The professional duty of moral influence is problematic, 
however, because it threatens overreaching by lawyers beyond their legal 
expertise, beyond their role as client agents and fiduciaries, and in contravention of 
rule-of-law values that client objectives should be limited by law rather than by the 
moral judgment of their lawyers. 
The new jurisprudential theories in legal ethics reject both a duty of moral 
counseling and the assumption that the bounds of the law must be understood 
according to the legal realist conception of law. Instead, they define lawyers‘ 
jurisprudential duties in interpreting the ―bounds of the law‖ to place real and 
sometimes substantial limits on lawyers‘ partisan advocacy. Jurisprudential 
theories of lawyering are an attractive alternative to moral lawyering theories 
because they derive limits on partisan advocacy from the practice of legal 
interpretation, which falls squarely within the scope of lawyers‘ expertise and 
decisionmaking authority in the lawyer–client relationship. However, 
jurisprudential theories of lawyering are successful only to the extent that they can 
provide a plausible and legitimate account of legal interpretation that is appropriate 
to the lawyer–client relationship and fitted to the role that lawyers play in the legal 
system and in society. 
Part II examines and evaluates two schools of thought within 
jurisprudential legal ethics: (1) William Simon‘s theory that lawyers should 
interpret the ―bounds of the law‖ according to underlying principles of justice in 
the style of a Dworkian judge, which joins the practice of lawyers advising clients 
about the law with the larger project of making law coherent and substantively 
just; and (2) positivist theories advanced by Bradley Wendel and Tim Dare, who 
argue that in interpreting the ―bounds of the law,‖ lawyers should respect the 
authority of law as society‘s resolution of contested moral and political 
disagreement and not seek to unsettle that resolution by stretching legal 
interpretation to meet either their clients‘ interests or their own conceptions of 
morality or justice. Part II concludes that neither school of jurisprudential theory 
achieves complete success as a jurisprudence of lawyering because even the 
moderate indeterminacy that each theory leaves behind creates too much space for 
lawyers to exercise judgment that is both pre-emptive of client decisionmaking and 
unreviewable by the public. 
Part III questions the common framing of the issues within the unfolding 
jurisprudence of lawyering as questions about how lawyers should interpret the 
―bounds of the law,‖ suggesting that this framework imposes an inappropriately 
lawyer-centered focus on assessments of the legitimacy of law. It proposes instead 
that lawyers have a jurisprudential duty to situate their clients to make 
appropriately informed decisions about how strictly to comply with the law or how 
best to order their affairs within legal frameworks based on the clients‘ 
assessments of the law‘s legitimacy. 
                                                                                                                
    9. See infra Part I.B. 
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The work of Ted Schneyer both inspires and guides this Article‘s analysis 
of lawyers‘ jurisprudential duties. The jurisprudential project is one that Schneyer 
has specifically advocated, calling on legal ethicists to ―help lawyers internalize a 
jurisprudence‖ that takes a middle ground between moral activism and hired-gun 
instrumentalism.
10
 For those embarking on the jurisprudential project, Schneyer‘s 
work exemplifies two principles for making legal ethics theory responsive to 
practice and useful to practitioners. First, he has insisted that in theorizing about 
the role of lawyers, legal ethicists take into account the actual work that lawyers 
do. His groundbreaking article, ―Moral Philosophy‘s Standard Misconception of 
Legal Ethics,‖ drew heavily on sociological studies of how lawyers actually 
behave to challenge the assumptions about lawyer behavior on which the new legal 
ethics models were based.
11
 His studies and analysis of the creation of the ABA 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
12
 of lawyer discipline,
13
 the role of in-house 
counsel,
14
 and the regulation of lawyers in law firms
15
 and in dispute resolution 
processes
16
 are characterized by the same balanced, complex, and empirically 
grounded perspective on the challenges and motivations of practicing lawyers. 
Second, Schneyer‘s work reminds us that if theoretical legal ethics is to 
have meaning and value for lawyers, it must resonate with the basic values of the 
legal profession. He has repeatedly noted that a significant purpose of professional 
regulation is to protect clients and the public against lawyer self-interest, warning 
against the perils of using public values as a guidepost for legal ethics,
17
 and 
applauding the emergence of theories that preserve and elaborate the basic client-
                                                                                                                
  10. Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11, 26 
(1991). In this regard, Ted has noted that ―[w]ith an appropriately purposive jurisprudence, 
full-bore partisanship—doing everything one can for clients up to the limits of the law—
becomes less worrisome because the law as interpreted corresponds more closely with 
moral values or at least policy purposes.‖ Id. 
  11. Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy’s Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 
1984 WIS. L. REV. 1529. 
  12. Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677 (1989). 
  13. Ted Finman & Ted Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions 
in Regulating Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility, 29 UCLA L. REV. 67 (1981). 
  14. Ted Schneyer, Professionalism and Public Policy: The Case of House 
Counsel, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 449 (1988). 
  15. Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 
1 (1991) [hereinafter Schneyer, Discipline for Firms]; Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four 
Systems: Reflections on How Law Regulates the ―Ethical Infrastructure‖ of Law Firms, 39 
S. TEX. L. REV. 245 (1998) [hereinafter Schneyer, Ethical Infrastructure]; Geoffrey C. 
Hazard & Ted Schneyer, Regulatory Controls on Large Law Firms: A Comparative 
Perspective, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 593 (2002). 
  16. Ted Schneyer, The Organized Bar and the Collaborative Law Movement: A 
Study in Professional Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 289 (2008). 
  17. Ted Schneyer, Reforming Law Practice in the Pursuit of Justice: The Perils 
of Privileging ―Public‖ over Professional Values, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1831 (2002) 
[hereinafter Schneyer, Perils of Public Values]; see also Ted Schneyer, Who Should Define 
Arizona’s Corporate Attorney–Client Privilege?: Asserting Judicial Independence Through 
the Power to Regulate the Practice of Law, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 419 (2006). 
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centered values of the legal profession.
18
 These aspects of Schneyer‘s work have 
influenced the development of my own work in legal ethics and infuse the analysis 
I provide in this Article, paying tribute in a small way to the much larger influence 
of Schneyer‘s grounded realism and critical eye in legal ethics. 
I. LAW AND MORALITY IN LEGAL ETHICS 
The jurisprudential turn in legal ethics is a shift in theoretical focus from 
analyzing the moral dilemmas that lawyers face because of their professional role 
to questions of how lawyers should interpret the ―bounds of the law‖ that constrain 
their partisan representation of clients. This Part maps the emergence of 
jurisprudential theory in legal ethics by examining how ethically problematic legal 
realist conceptions of law set the stage for the jurisprudential turn in legal ethics, 
how the early legal ethicists proposed that lawyers make up for the ethical 
deficiencies of this implicit jurisprudence of lawyering by incorporating personal 
moral judgment into legal representation, and how the ―jurisprudential turn‖ 
avoids the problems with this moral alternative. 
A. Legal Realism as the Operating Jurisprudence of Practicing Lawyers 
Legal ethicists have identified legal realist conceptions of law as a core 
component of the implicit operating jurisprudence of everyday lawyers.
19
 Legal 
Realism identified a gap between the ―law in books‖ and the ―law in action,‖ 
which Roscoe Pound described as ―a very real and a very deep‖ distinction 
between ―the rules that purport to govern the relations of man and man and those 
that in fact govern them.‖20 Legal Realists insisted that accurate description of the 
―real rules‖ that govern society cannot be captured by parsing the words of statutes 
or the written opinions of appellate judges, but must include study of the way that 
―paper rules‖ are interpreted, implemented, applied, or ignored as they are carried 
into practice.
21
 As Karl Llewellyn ruminated, the business of law is dispute 
resolution and ―whether they be judges or sheriffs or clerks or jailers or lawyers 
. . . . What these officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself.‖22 
Although the legal realist ―prediction theory‖ has well-demonstrated 
shortcomings as a definition of law, it is a functional point of view for lawyers to 
                                                                                                                
  18. Ted Schneyer, The Promise and Problematics of Legal Ethics from the 
Lawyer‘s Point of View, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 45, 70–78 (2004). 
  19. Pepper, Lawyers’ Amoral Role, supra note 4, at 624–25; DAVID LUBAN, 
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 18–20 (1988); see also Brian Leiter, Rethinking 
Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 275 (1997) 
(―[T]he Core Claim of Realism is that judges reach decisions based on what they think 
would be fair on the facts of the case, rather than on the basis of the applicable rules of 
law.‖). 
  20. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15 
(1910). 
  21. Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Steps, 30 COLUM. L. 
REV. 431, 447–57 (1930). 
  22. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: THE CLASSIC LECTURES ON THE 
LAW AND LAW SCHOOL 5 (1930).  
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take in advising clients.
23
 The law that matters most to clients is the law that will 
affect their lives directly; and lower-court judges and other legal officials often 
provide the final statement of the law in a client‘s case.24 Indeed, lawyers who did 
not take account of gaps between what the ―law in books‖ says and how the law is 
likely to be applied or implemented in a client‘s case might be criticized for 
providing legal advice that, while technically accurate, was nonetheless useless to 
their clients as a practical matter. 
However, the legal realist conception of law is also ethically problematic. 
When translated from the predictions of lower-level officials in clients‘ cases to a 
more general conception of law, the radical indeterminacy inherent in the legal 
realist conception of law poses one set of problems.
25
 If law is nothing other than 
what legal officials do in implementing the law, no official interpretation of law 
can be said to be better than any other.
26
 To illustrate this point, Brad Wendel asks 
us to consider the interpretive challenge posed by a lawyer representing a mining 
company required by federal law to pay disability benefits to employees who are 
―totally disabled‖ due to Black Lung Disease.27 Suppose a former employee has 
been receiving benefits from the company based on the presence of a lesion on his 
lung measuring 1.5 cm, a condition entitling him to a statutory presumption that he 
is ―totally disabled.‖28 After the benefits have paid for a lung transplant, a creative 
reading of the statute might arguably permit the company to terminate disability 
payments for the expensive medication and treatment necessary to keep his body 
from rejecting the new lung. Because the new lung no longer has a lesion, the 
argument might go, the employee is no longer presumptively ―totally disabled,‖ 
and must go through a time consuming administrative process to prove his 
disability.
29
 Wendel argues that nothing in the implicit operating jurisprudence of 
traditional lawyering constrains this interpretation; as long as there is a 
nonfrivolous argument supporting the interpretation, the lawyer would be entitled 
(and maybe even required) to deploy it on behalf of the client.
30
 
                                                                                                                
  23. The ―prediction theory of law‖ has been reduced to absurdity when applied 
to appellate judges, who cannot coherently be said to be predicting their own behavior when 
they decide cases. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 141–47 (2d ed. 1994); see also 
LUBAN, supra note 19, at 22–23. However, from the perspective of lawyers advising clients, 
prediction is coherent. See Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. 
REV. 651, 656–60 (1995). 
  24. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 50–51 (1930); Llewellyn, 
supra note 21, at 455–56. 
  25. Wilkins, supra note 3, at 474–75. 
  26. Id. at 484. If the legal realist conception of law as prediction of official 
behavior is spun even more radically, no way of influencing legal officials can be said to be 
better than any other; the legitimacy of bribery and threats cannot be distinguished from the 
legitimacy of a persuasive legal argument. LUBAN, supra note 19, at 20–21. 
  27. W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 389–93 
(2004). 
  28. Id. at 389–91. 
  29. Id. at 391–92. 
  30. Id. at 391. 
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The legal realist conception of law is also ethically problematic because 
the ―external point of view‖ it takes on law strips law of its normative content.31 
Holmes famously wrote that ―[i]f you want to know the law and nothing else, you 
must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which 
such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons 
for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of 
conscience.‖32 The Holmesian ―bad man‖ view of the law undermines respect for 
law as a source of normative guidance and replaces it with a view of law as 
―something like a force of nature, which can be studied and hopefully avoided, but 
which does not alter the citizen‘s practical reasoning.‖33 Because the Holmesian 
―bad man‖ perspective encourages citizens to continually unsettle the boundaries 
set by law as they seek to avoid its enforcement, it also limits law‘s effectiveness 
and increases its cost as a mechanism to coordinate and structure the common life 
of society.
34
 
Of particular concern among legal ethicists is the prospect that by 
advising clients about the law from a legal realist perspective, lawyers encourage 
otherwise law-abiding or law-respecting citizens to view the law more 
instrumentally than they otherwise would.
35
 A client might enter a lawyer‘s office 
as a Holmesian good man who views the law as a source of normative guidance on 
a human problem (or, as Hart might say, as ―the ‗puzzled man‘ or ‗ignorant man‘ 
who is willing to do what is required, if only he can be told what it is‖).36 In the 
lawyer‘s translation of the client‘s situation from a human problem into a legal 
problem, the lawyer will tend to define the client‘s objectives as coextensive with 
the client‘s legal interests, which most often revolve around maximizing the 
client‘s wealth, freedom, or power over others.37 In the process, the lawyer will 
―distill out, or disguise, the moral dimension and the more complex human 
elements from the situation.‖38 In advising clients that they ―should do‖ what it is 
in their legal interests to do, lawyers may implicitly encourage clients to press their 
legal interests further than the clients might otherwise be inclined to go.
39
 As 
Stephen Pepper has pointed out, the unfortunate result is that both the lawyer and 
the client can evade moral responsibility for decisions that harm others, with the 
lawyer perceiving moral decisions to be outside the realm of legal advice, and the 
                                                                                                                
  31. See generally W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers, Citizens and the Internal Point 
of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473 (2006). 
  32. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 
(1897). 
  33. Wendel, supra note 31, at 1473. 
  34. Id. at 1473–76; Pepper, Counseling at the Limits, supra note 4, at 1553. 
  35. Pepper, Lawyers’ Amoral Role, supra note 4, at 625–26; see also Katherine 
R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 133 
(2010). 
  36. HART, supra note 23, at 40. 
  37. See generally Warren Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client’s Interests, 77 MICH. 
L. REV. 1078 (1979); Simon, supra note 8, at 52–59; Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as 
Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 21 (1975). 
  38. Stephen L. Pepper, Lawyers’ Ethics in the Gap Between Law and Justice, 40 
S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 188 (1999). 
  39. Kruse, supra note 35, at 133; Lehman, supra note 37, at 1088–90. 
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client perceiving the lawyer‘s advice as authority or permission to do only what 
the law requires and no more.
40
 
Taking the ethically problematic legal realist jurisprudence of the 
―bounds of the law‖ as a set feature of legal representation, early legal ethicists 
turned to moral theory, arguing that lawyers have a duty to reign in their partisan 
zeal by supplementing the ―bounds of the law‖ with additional constraints based 
on the personal moral judgments that lawyers would make outside their 
professional roles.
41
 The next section demonstrates how both critics and defenders 
of legal realism as a jurisprudence of practicing lawyers turned to this moral 
solution, differing primarily on the question of how robust a role lawyers‘ moral 
judgments should play in legal representation. 
B. The Professional Duty to Exercise Moral Judgment 
When legal ethics developed as an academic discipline in the mid-1970s, 
its theoretical roots were in moral philosophy.
42
 Many of the early theorists in legal 
ethics were moral philosophers by training, and they explored legal ethics as a 
branch of moral philosophy.
43
 From the moral philosophical point of view, 
lawyers‘ professional duties were a ―role morality‖ defining what it meant to be a 
―good lawyer,‖ and the most interesting questions in legal ethics were not the 
nature of lawyers‘ ethical lapses, but whether ―the professional ideal is itself 
morally worthy.‖44 The central question that captured the attention of these moral 
philosophers was put succinctly by Charles Fried as the opening sentence of a 
seminal article in the field: ―Can a good lawyer be a good person?‖45 
Moral philosophers understood lawyers‘ role morality by reference to 
principles of partisanship and neutrality in what they called the ―standard 
conception‖ of the lawyer‘s role.46 As the moral philosophers saw it, the standard 
                                                                                                                
  40. Pepper, supra note 38, at 188–92. 
  41. Kruse, supra note 35, at 122–29. 
  42. Although theoretical legal ethics solidified as an academic field in legal 
scholarship in the 1970s, conceptions of the ethics and role of lawyers in society have long 
reflected and been grounded in jurisprudential theories and political philosophy. See 
generally Russell G. Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue State: Reflections on Public 
Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Legal Ethics, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339 (2006). The 
earliest American legal ethicists grounded their conception of lawyers as a governing class 
in natural law jurisprudence and republican political theory. Id. at 1346–50. 
  43. See David Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
873, 878–81 (1999) [hereinafter Luban, Reason and Passion] (describing this history); 
David Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse: A Philosophical Research Program for Legal 
Ethics, 40 MD. L. REV. 451, 452 (1981) (laying out a research agenda of legal ethics 
questions amendable to study and guidance by moral philosophy). 
  44. DAVID LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYER‘S ROLES AND LAWYERS‘ ETHICS 
1 (David Luban ed., 1984). 
  45. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of 
the Lawyer–Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1060 (1976) (asking whether it is possible 
for ―a good lawyer [to] be a good person‖). I have explored and critiqued this history in 
more depth in Kruse, supra note 35, at 107–22. 
  46. Authors have called the principles by various names and defined the 
principles differently. LUBAN, supra note 19, at 7. As defined in the early legal ethical 
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conception ―committed [lawyers] to the aggressive and single-minded pursuit of 
the client‘s objectives‖ not only within the law, but ―all the way up to[] the limits 
of the law.‖47 They saw lawyers‘ deployment of the legal realist conception of the 
―bounds of the law‖ as a thinly justified lack of respect for law in the name of 
partisan zeal, which impelled lawyers past the ordinary meaning and intended 
purpose of legal limits to embrace any colorable interpretation of law that suited 
their clients‘ interests—a style of interpretation David Luban called ―zeal at the 
margin.‖48 However, they did not develop any alternative jurisprudence of 
lawyering to replace legal realist conceptions of the ―bounds of the law.‖ 
To make up for the deficiencies created by the legal realist conception of 
the bounds of the law, moral theorists conceived a robust role for lawyers‘ 
morality in legal representation. At its most extreme, ―moral activist‖ lawyering 
tolerated only ―the most minor deviations from common morality‖ by lawyers in 
most civil cases.
49
 Moral theorists argued that lawyers should have the prerogative 
to withhold legal services to persons whose projects they found morally 
objectionable.
50
 Additionally, they urged strategies of moral-activist client 
counseling, in which lawyers ―take it upon themselves to judge and shape client 
projects‖51 and actively ―steer [their] clients in the direction of the public good‖52 
by employing strategies of persuasion, coercion, or even betrayal, to align the 
client‘s decision with the lawyer‘s moral judgment.53 
                                                                                                                
writings, the principle of partisanship required lawyers to maximize their clients‘ objectives 
―within, but all the way up to[] the limits of the law.‖ Gerald J. Postema, Moral 
Responsibility in Legal Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 73 (1980) (emphasis omitted); Murray 
L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 669, 
673 (1978). The principle of neutrality relieved lawyers of moral responsibility for the 
harmful effects on others of actions taken in pursuit of their clients‘ objectives. See 
Postema, supra, at 73; Schwartz, supra, at 673. 
  47. Postema, supra note 46, at 73. 
  48. DAVID LUBAN, The Adversary System Excuse, in HUMAN DIGNITY, supra 
note 1, at 19, 26. 
  49. LUBAN, supra note 19, at 149. This conclusion is embedded within Luban‘s 
larger argument that lawyers should take into account the moral justifications for their 
adversarial role and weigh the strength of those justifications against the moral harm that 
adhering to the role would cause. Id. at 128–47. According to Luban, where a lawyer 
represents an individual squaring off against the state or a powerful institution, the moral 
justifications for zealous partisan advocacy are strong. Id. at 148. It is in representing clients 
with power greater than, or roughly equal to, their opponents that the adversary system is 
only weakly justified. Id. at 92. In such cases, Luban argued, lawyers would be morally 
enjoined from pursuing legally permissible but ―substantively unjust results.‖ Id. at 157. 
  50. David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 
1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 642. 
  51. David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41 
VAND. L. REV. 717, 738 (1988). 
  52. Id. at 721; LUBAN, supra note 19, at 171. 
  53. See Luban, supra note 51, at 721. It should be noted, however, that this is an 
extreme. David Luban, the original proponent of ―moral activist‖ client counseling has 
described the heart of moral activist counseling as ―discussing with the client the rightness 
and wrongness of her projects, and the possible impact of those projects [on ‗the people‘] in 
the same matter-of-fact and (one hopes) unmoralistic manner that one discusses the 
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The legal realist conception of the ―bounds of the law‖ was not without 
defenders, the most prominent of whom was Stephen Pepper. Pepper raised early 
objections to the moral theorists‘ project and argued that the legal realist 
conception of law was a morally justified jurisprudence for lawyers.
54
 Pepper‘s 
defense was based on the premise that the core function of lawyers is to provide 
―access to the law‖ as a public good. The primary function of providing ―access to 
law‖ creates, at the very least, a rebuttable presumption that clients are entitled to 
full information about the law, including information about available loopholes 
and the limits of law enforcement.
55
 In cases where ―the law is manipulable and 
without clear limits on client conduct,‖ Pepper argued, ―that aspect of the law 
should be accessible to the client.‖56 To limit access to the law based on lawyers‘ 
personal views of right and wrong would threaten the status of law as a public 
good and undermine the underlying values of autonomy, equality and diversity.
57
 
Yet, as Pepper recognized, the indeterminacy and lack of normative 
content in the legal realist conception of law creates inevitable gaps between what 
the client has a legal right to do and what it is morally right for the client to do.
58
 
Pepper and other defenders of the legal realist conception of law sought to close 
the gap between law and morality by emphasizing that lawyers have secondary 
obligations to exercise moral judgment in selecting clients, to engage their clients 
in moral dialogue, or both.
59
 However, Pepper delineated only limited 
circumstances in which it would be appropriate for lawyers to refuse 
representation or engage in moral dialogue with clients, noting the interference of 
such actions with the primary duty of providing access to the law.
60
 
In the end, those who defended the legal realist conception of law as a 
legitimate operating jurisprudence for everyday lawyers and those who bemoaned 
it as an unfortunate reality of legal practice ended up debating the proper boundary 
between law and morality in legal representation within the same theoretical 
structure. Each camp understood the ―bounds of the law‖ to incorporate the legal 
realists‘ conception of law as open-textured, manipulable, and devoid of normative 
content. Because such limits are ultimately incapable of preventing moral harm, 
each camp agreed that lawyers have a professional duty to supplement legal advice 
with personal moral judgment in the form of moral dialogue with clients, a duty to 
refuse representation on moral grounds, or both. They differed primarily on 
                                                                                                                
financial aspects of a representation.‖ David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy 
in the Lawyer–Client Relationship, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1026 (1990) (quoting LUBAN, 
supra note 19, at 173). 
  54. Pepper, Lawyers’ Amoral Role, supra note 4, at 624–28. 
  55. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits, supra note 4, at 1598–1600. 
  56. Pepper, Lawyers’ Amoral Role, supra note 4, at 626. 
  57. Stephen L. Pepper, A Rejoinder to Professors Kaufman and Luban, 1986 
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 657, 662–67. 
  58. Pepper, supra note 38, at 186. 
  59. Pepper, Lawyers’ Amoral Role, supra note 4, at 630–35; see also Monroe H. 
Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a Professional System, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 191, 199–
204 (1978). 
  60. Pepper, supra note 38, at 192–96; Pepper, Lawyers’ Amoral Role, supra note 
4, at 632–33. 
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questions of how strongly and in what circumstances it was appropriate for 
lawyers to bridge the gaps between law and justice by bringing their moral 
influence to bear in legal representation of their clients.
61
 
C. The Problems with Deploying Personal Moral Judgment in the Line of 
Professional Duty 
The reliance on lawyers‘ moral judgments to supplement and limit the 
professional duty of partisan advocacy creates significant tensions with lawyers‘ 
role in the legal system. The permission given to lawyers to pursue client 
objectives all the way to the ―bounds of the law‖ is grounded in rule-of-law values 
that individuals should be free to pursue their projects and objectives within limits 
set through open, public, and democratic processes.
62
 When lawyers supplement 
these legal boundaries and curtail or withhold legal representation based on their 
private and personal judgments about whether clients‘ projects or objectives are 
morally worthy, society runs the risk of substituting the rule of law with the rule of 
an ―oligarchy of lawyers.‖63 The tension becomes especially acute in the context of 
a morally pluralistic society, where the promotion of a robust role for morality in 
the lawyer–client relationship can become a license for lawyers to impose their 
personal resolution of contested moral issues on their clients‘ life choices.64 
Although lawyers are not ethically prevented from providing moral 
advice to their clients,
65
 attempts to fashion a professional duty to incorporate 
moral judgment into legal representation strain against the nature and purpose of 
the lawyer–client relationship. The lawyer–client relationship is a fiduciary 
relationship, in which the lawyer acts for the benefit of the client, bringing legal 
knowledge and expertise to bear on matters of great importance to the client.
66
 As 
Tim Dare has argued, because of the imbalance of legal knowledge and expertise, 
clients have only limited ability to assess their lawyers‘ competence and diligence 
and very little information from which to ascertain the lawyer‘s personal, moral, or 
political views.
67
 Although some ethicists have argued that the ideal lawyer–client 
relationship should be like a friendship, in which lawyers and clients mutually 
strive for goodness as they collaborate in addressing the moral issues that 
inevitably arise in legal representation,
68
 clients typically don‘t have the personal 
information about their lawyers that we rely on when we turn to friends for moral 
                                                                                                                
  61. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 50, at 649 (characterizing his difference with 
Pepper as one of degree rather than kind). This observation is less accurate with respect to 
Freedman, who grounds the importance of moral dialogue in respect for the client‘s dignity. 
Freedman, supra note 59, at 203–04. 
  62. Wilkins, supra note 3, at 472–73. 
  63. Pepper, Lawyers’ Amoral Role, supra note 4, at 617. 
  64. DARE, supra note 1, at 74–75; Wendel, supra note 27, at 376–83. 
  65. The Model Rules contemplate that moral considerations may be part of the 
lawyer‘s duty to ―exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.‖ 
MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2009). 
  66. DARE, supra note 1, at 89–94. 
  67. Id. at 89–93. 
  68. THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS AND 
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 46–53 (2d ed. 2009). 
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guidance, such as whether they share our values or have the life experience to 
understand our dilemmas or empathize with our struggles.
69
 When a lawyer takes 
on the goal of morally educating the client or making the client a better person 
through moral conversation, the problems of lack of moral expertise, risk of moral 
overreaching, and threat to rule-of-law values arise. 
The moral theorists‘ premise that the public would benefit from the moral 
guidance that lawyers have to offer is also debatable. Moral judgment falls outside 
the scope of specifically legal expertise. Although some scholars have argued that 
lawyers‘ training and experience endows them with superior capacity to exercise 
sound moral judgment,
70
 just as many have argued that lawyers‘ habitation of their 
professional role impairs their moral capacities.
71
 Moreover, the incorporation of 
moral judgment into legal representation has the paradoxical quality of being least 
effective in shaping moral outcomes in the situations in which it is acknowledged 
to be most appropriate. Legal ethicists across the spectrum agree that the lawyer‘s 
moral management of legal representation is least appropriate for clients who are 
vulnerable to moral overreaching by their lawyers due to their relative lack of 
power, sophistication, and capacity to seek a second opinion from another 
lawyer.
72
 Yet they acknowledge that more sophisticated and powerful clients are 
less likely to tolerate a lawyer‘s moral maneuvering, either by brushing off moral 
advice as irrelevant or by seeking legal representation from a lawyer who will 
provide representation free of moral challenge.
73
 
The jurisprudential turn in legal ethics presents an attractive alternative to 
the moral theoretical solution to over-zealous partisanship because it provides 
limits on lawyers‘ no-holds-barred partisanship that spring directly from lawyers‘ 
professional duties rather than from appeals to personal morality that compete with 
professional duty. The turn to jurisprudential theory promises to remain consonant 
with rule-of-law values by limiting lawyers‘ partisan pursuit of client interests 
based on correct or legitimate interpretation of the law. Because the interpretation 
of law is a quintessential lawyering task, it falls squarely within the scope of 
lawyers‘ expertise and authority within the lawyer–client relationship. A lawyer 
who interprets the law to set limits on client objectives thus avoids the dangers of 
moral overreaching with vulnerable clients and gains traction with more powerful 
clients. 
II. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL TURN IN LEGAL ETHICS 
In the recent jurisprudential turn in legal ethics, theorists draw on 
jurisprudential theories to ground lawyers‘ interpretations of the ―bounds of the 
law‖ in the role that lawyers play in the legal system and the role that law plays in 
                                                                                                                
  69. DARE, supra note 1, at 95. 
  70. See generally ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS 
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 109–62 (1993). 
  71. Wasserstrom, supra note 37, at 15; Postema, supra note 46, at 75–80. 
  72. Pepper, supra note 38, at 194–95; SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 68, at 
54–57. 
  73. Pepper, supra note 38, at 193–94. 
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society.
74
 This Part describes and evaluates the relative successes and 
shortcomings of two alternative jurisprudential theories of correct or appropriate 
interpretation that have been advanced within legal ethics: (1) William Simon‘s 
theory that lawyers should interpret the ―bounds of the law‖ according to 
underlying principles of justice in the style of a Dworkian judge; and (2) positivist 
theories advanced by Bradley Wendel and Tim Dare, which argue that in 
interpreting the ―bounds of the law‖ lawyers should respect the authority of law as 
society‘s resolution of contested moral and political disagreement and not seek to 
unsettle that resolution by stretching legal interpretation to meet either their 
clients‘ interests or their own conceptions of morality or justice. 
Jurisprudential questions of what makes legal interpretation legitimate 
have more commonly been explored in the context of adjudication, and invoke 
separation-of-powers issues regarding the role of judges in a democratic system of 
law. The jurisprudence of lawyering re-frames the questions of correct or 
appropriate interpretation within the context of the lawyer–client relationship.75 
The stakes are arguably higher in the context of legal representation than they are 
in adjudication because lawyers‘ interpretations of the ―bounds of the law‖ are 
carried out in the private and unreviewable context of the lawyer–client 
relationship.
76
 To the extent that lawyers‘ interpretations of law deviate too 
radically from law‘s ordinary meaning and intended purpose, lawyers privately 
undermine publicly and democratically established frameworks for establishing 
societal norms through law. Moreover, the consequences of incorrect or 
illegitimate interpretation fall directly on clients, who often lack the necessary 
expertise to challenge their lawyers‘ legal interpretations. As David Luban has 
written (borrowing a metaphor from Hart), ―the Nightmare vision of legal advice‖ 
consists in the twin dangers that lawyers will ―dominate and manipulate clients, 
either to advance their own agenda or to line their own pockets,‖ or lawyers will 
―treat the advisor‘s role like that of an advocate and spin the law to support 
whatever the client wishes to do.‖77 The ―Noble Dream in a jurisprudence centered 
on the lawyer-advisor‖ is based on a vision of lawyers acting as intermediaries 
between the law and those it governs.
78
 
The jurisprudence of lawyering aspires to fill out the details of the Noble 
Dream of lawyers acting as intermediaries between the law and those it governs by 
describing and justifying the appropriate interpretive practices for lawyers in 
setting the ―bounds of the law‖ within which their clients are entitled to operate. 
To succeed as a jurisprudence of lawyering, a theory must deliver on promises that 
                                                                                                                
  74. Wendel, supra note 2, at 1176–77.  
  75. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Who Should Define Arizona’s Corporate Attorney–
Client Privilege?: Asserting Judicial Independence Through the Power to Regulate the 
Practice of Law, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 419, 445 (2006). 
  76. The institutional constraints on common law judging, such as the 
requirements that judges reduce their opinions to writing, sit on panels, and hear the benefit 
of adversary argument have been acknowledged by even Legal Realist Karl Llewellyn to 
bring a sense of ―reckonability‖ to the law. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW 
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 19–51 (1960). 
  77. LUBAN, supra note 2, at 158–59. 
  78. Id. at 159–60. 
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the ―bounds of the law‖ makes to clients and to the public. As David Wilkins has 
written, legal ethics imposes complementary professional duties on lawyers to 
further the private interests of particular individuals on the one hand, and to respect 
and preserve ―the fair and efficient administration of justice‖ on the other.79 The 
directive to ―represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law‖ strikes a 
balance between these private and public interests.
80
 It promises clients that the 
pursuit of their ends will be limited only by objective and identifiable external 
constraints rather than by their lawyers‘ personal or idiosyncratic moral or political 
views,
81
 and it promises the public that ―the pursuit of private ends will not unduly 
frustrate public purposes.‖82 Moreover, the ―bounds of the law‖ are an ostensibly 
legitimate constraint on the pursuit of private ends because law‘s authority derives 
from the will of the people, who control its boundary through democratic 
processes.
83
 
To deliver on the promise to clients—that their projects will be limited by 
objectively identifiable boundaries set by legitimate democratic processes rather 
than by the personal or idiosyncratic views of their lawyers—a jurisprudence of 
lawyering must constrain lawyers from displacing the public resolution of policy 
issues with their personal views. To deliver on the promise to the public—that the 
partisan pursuit of private ends will not unduly frustrate the public interest—a 
jurisprudence of lawyering must constrain lawyers from manipulating the meaning 
of law in ways that skew the bounds of the law toward their clients‘ private ends. 
The legal realist implicit jurisprudence of everyday lawyering, which 
―stresses [law‘s] open-textured, vague nature over its precision; its manipulability 
over its certainty; and its instrumental possibilities over its normative content,‖84 
arguably fails to deliver on these promises to either clients or the public for two 
reasons.
85
 First, the agnosticism about correct or legitimate interpretation in the 
legal realist conception of law conflicts with the rule-of-law notion that disputes 
among members of a society ought to be resolved by reference to impartially 
applied rules and principles, rather than lawyers‘ idiosyncratic or personal 
beliefs.
86
 It unravels the traditional legal ethical model‘s promise to the public by 
opening the door for lawyers‘ instrumentalist manipulation of the ―bounds of the 
law‖ that are supposed to constrain their partisanship,87 effectively collapsing 
lawyers‘ public duties into the pursuit of their clients‘ private interests.88 Second, it 
                                                                                                                
  79. Wilkins, supra note 3, at 470–71. 
  80. Id. at 473–74. 
  81. Id. at 472. 
  82. Id. at 471. 
  83. Id. at 473. 
  84. Pepper, Lawyers’ Amoral Role, supra note 4, at 624–26. 
  85. Wilkins, supra note 3, at 484. 
  86. Dorf, supra note 23, at 680–89. Some legal realists argued that judges decide 
cases primarily based on personal or idiosyncratic hunches and then search for legal 
justification in conceptual rules. See FRANK, supra note 24, at 111–12; Joseph C. Hutcheson, 
Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the ―Hunch‖ in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL 
L. REV. 274 (1928). 
  87. See Postema, supra note 46, at 73; see also LUBAN, supra note 19, at 18–19. 
  88. Wilkins, supra note 3, at 483–84.  
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threatens clients‘ interests by positioning lawyers to deploy interpretations of the 
law that secure their own financial or reputational interests at the expense of their 
clients.
89
 
To the extent that proposed alternative jurisprudential theories deliver 
determinate answers to questions of legal interpretation, they can fulfill the 
promises of legal ethics to clients and to the public. The central question for a 
jurisprudence of lawyering is how well it guides lawyers faced with a range of 
plausible interpretations to resolve the open questions of interpretation that remain. 
As Brad Wendel has written, theories of legal ethics are ―‗normative all the way 
down,‘ with a theory of democracy justifying a theory of the function of law, 
which in turn justifies a conception of the lawyer‘s role.‖90 It is by reference to this 
normative substructure that lawyers can escape the problems raised by the moral 
theories in legal ethics and make judgments grounded in professional values 
incident to their role in the legal system.
91
 The success of a jurisprudence of 
lawyering rides on whether it provides criteria for choosing among plausible 
interpretations that appropriately balance the public and private interests at stake 
when lawyers advise clients about the law. 
A. Substantive Justice and Dworkian Interpretation 
William Simon was the first legal ethicist to break from the fold of moral 
theory and explicitly ground legal ethics in jurisprudential theory.
92
 Simon 
proposed replacing the various categorical and client-centered norms in legal 
ethics—zeal, confidentiality, loyalty—with a single imperative that lawyers 
exercise discretionary and contextualized judgment to ―take such actions as, 
considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to 
promote justice,‖ or as he synonymously called it, ―legal merit.‖93 In deciding 
questions of justice, Simon proposed that lawyers invoke the same style of 
contextual reasoning that judges employ in deciding questions of law, taking into 
account the background values, principles and purposes that underlie the letter of 
                                                                                                                
  89. Some analysts suggest that in advising clients, lawyers do just that. See, e.g., 
AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS: POWER 
AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 106–07 (1995) (documenting conversations between 
divorce lawyers and clients); Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence 
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  90. Wendel, supra note 2, at 1176–77. 
  91. See generally W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional 
Responsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1999). 
  92. SIMON, supra note 1, at 13 (―An important premise of my argument is that 
the key issues of legal ethics are jurisprudential, that is, they implicate questions of the 
nature and purpose of law and the legal system.‖); see also Luban, Reason and Passion, 
supra note 43, at 877–85. 
  93. SIMON, supra note 1, at 9, 138. 
2011] JURISPRUDENTIAL TURN 509 
the law and provide it with legitimate authority.
94
 In Simon‘s view, a lawyer‘s 
determinations of what actions seem likely to promote justice are not simply 
expressions of lawyers‘ personal or moral beliefs; rather, they are ―legal judgments 
grounded in the methods and sources of authority of the professional culture.‖95 
Simon‘s equation of ―justice‖ and ―legal merit‖ and the style of legal 
reasoning he prescribed for determining the ―bounds of the law‖ borrow heavily 
from the jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin.
96
 Like Dworkin, Simon argued that 
background values, principles and purposes ―are part of the law in the sense that 
they affect the decisions of cases.‖97 More importantly, Simon argued, law‘s 
consistency with these background values provides the strongest reason to respect 
and obey the law.
98
 Simon‘s jurisprudence of lawyering invites lawyers to join 
Dworkin‘s project of making law the best it can be by interpreting the ―bounds of 
the law‖ according to principles of justice that both fit with past interpretations of 
law and justify its continued legitimacy.
99
 
Simon argued that the ―dominant view‖ of legal ethics defines law too 
narrowly in positivist terms that privilege its form over its substance.
100
 Such a 
narrow interpretation is problematic in Simon‘s view because it mandates that 
lawyers adhere to technical legal limits even when the law is unfair or has become 
outmoded.
101
 At the same time, it encourages lawyers to structure client affairs in 
ways that technically comply with the letter of the law even though they 
undermine law‘s purposes.102 Simon argued that lawyers should resist these 
temptations of technical adherence to positive law and interpret the ―bounds of the 
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  97. SIMON, supra note 1, at 38. 
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996–97 (1999). 
  99. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 96. 
100. Simon argued that the traditional partisan approach to lawyering—what he 
called the ―dominant view‖ of legal ethics—defines the ―bounds of the law‖ narrowly 
according to positivist criteria of whether law has been ―enacted or adopted by recognized 
lawmaking institutions of the state‖ and whether it ―take[s] the form of commands or 
prohibitions backed by penalties.‖ SIMON, supra note 1, at 27. 
101. See id. at 78. 
102. Id. at 145. 
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law‖ that constrain their partisan advocacy more expansively.103 Under Simon‘s 
proposed jurisprudence, lawyers may be required to stop short of the arguable 
limits of the law by foregoing possible interpretations of law that are inconsistent 
with underlying principles of justice.
104
 Conversely, and more controversially, 
lawyers may be required to nullify unjust laws by noncompliance with their formal 
terms.
105
 
Although Simon‘s jurisprudence borrows a style of legal interpretation 
associated with Dworkian adjudication, it is a jurisprudence designed for lawyers, 
not judges. Accordingly, Simon emphasized that in making judgments about the 
actions most likely to promote justice, lawyers must take into account a threshold 
question of institutional competence, comparing their own capacity to reach 
reliable determinations of justice with that of other legal officials.
106
 The adversary 
system assigns to lawyers a role as client advocates, Simon posited, because judges 
and other legal officials are usually better positioned than lawyers to reach reliable 
determinations of justice.
107
 In situations where the adversary system is 
functioning effectively, lawyers can comfortably inhabit their traditional role as 
client advocates, deferring to the judgment of other legal officials to declare and 
apply the law correctly.
108
 However, where the institutional competence of existing 
procedures is in question—such as where a matter is unlikely to come before an 
official decisionmaker; where an adverse party or official decisionmaker ―lacks 
information or resources needed to initiate, pursue or determine a claim‖; or where 
officials are ―corrupt, or politically intimidated, or incompetent‖—lawyers must 
step into the breach and take direct responsibility for substantive justice.
109
 
Simon‘s jurisprudence represents an advance over both the ethically 
problematic legal realist jurisprudence of ordinary practice and the moral activist 
alternative. Unlike the radical indeterminacy suggested in the legal realist 
conception, Simon‘s jurisprudence requires lawyers to justify deviations from 
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which undermine the smooth operation of the system and diminish the likelihood of reliable 
and just results. Id. at 143. 
108. Id. at 138. As Robert Gordon points out, however, most cases will not 
deliver this kind of comfort zone because even with the best-matched adversaries, the 
adversary system has the capacity to ―horribly malfunction.‖ Robert W. Gordan, The 
Radical Conservatism of The Practice of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 919, 926 (1999). 
109. SIMON, supra note 1, at 140. 
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formal legal requirements with respect to public values that are arguably reflected 
in law. Unlike the moral activist alternative, the process Simon prescribes for 
searching out legal merit introduces genuinely legal considerations into lawyers‘ 
reasoning about what justice requires, disciplining lawyers to look beyond their 
own moral and political beliefs to ascertain justice in terms of legal norms and 
shared interpretive practices of the legal profession.
110
 
Moreover, Simon‘s jurisprudence ostensibly fulfills the promises that 
legal ethics makes to both the public and to clients: that the ―bounds of the law‖ 
will protect the public interest by limiting over-zealous partisanship, and that the 
limits on partisanship will reflect objective and legitimate criteria rather than the 
idiosyncratic personal or political views of lawyers. Under Simon‘s view, lawyers 
who refuse to advance unjust claims or refrain from over-zealous tactics do not 
impose their personal moral views on their clients; they simply judge such claims 
and tactics to be legally invalid.
111
 Because clients are not entitled to pursue legally 
invalid claims, lawyers‘ judgments to forego claims or tactics based on 
determinations of legal merit remain consistent with rule-of-law values and do not 
risk moral overreaching with vulnerable clients. In interactions with more 
powerful clients, Simon‘s jurisprudence provides lawyers with the traction that 
moral counseling denies them, because lawyers can advise their clients that the 
law—interpreted according to its background values and underlying principles—
simply does not permit the lawyers to pursue morally questionable claims or 
abusive hyper-zealous tactics. 
However, the capacity of Simon‘s jurisprudence to deliver on these 
promises rides on the questionable ability of his Dworkian conception of law to 
determine true or correct answers to lawyers‘ contextual judgments of legal merit. 
As critics have pointed out, if lawyers‘ assessments of ―legal merit‖ turn primarily 
on lawyers‘ subjective personal, moral or political beliefs, Simon‘s theory ends 
merely restating the moral theorists‘ solution to the problems of legal 
professionalism in legal terms.
112
 In response, Simon appears to adopt a version of 
Dworkin‘s ―right answer‖ thesis: that most cases will provide at least a ―best 
interpretation‖ if not a ―right answer‖ to the question of how the background 
principles and fundamental values in law cohere.
113
 Simon concedes—as he 
must—that in applying his justice-based theory of legal ethics ―not all lawyers 
[will] agree in any given situation on how the applicable principles apply.‖114 But 
he attributes the variant results to the fact that ―[i]ndividual lawyers will make 
mistakes,‖115 suggesting that correct interpretations of what justice requires in 
                                                                                                                
110. Id. at 102–03. Simon maintained that his theory of legal ethics asks only that 
―the lawyer make the best effort she reasonably can to vindicate the relevant legal merit.‖ 
Simon, supra note 98, at 996. 
111. West, Zealous Advocacy for Justice, supra note 96, at 979–80. 
112. Both moral theorists and jurisprudential positivists in legal ethics have 
leveled this critique at Simon‘s theory of legal ethics. Luban, Reason and Passion, supra 
note 43, at 885–88; Wendel, supra note 27, at 373–75. 
113. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81, 
123–30 (1977). 
114. SIMON, supra note 1, at 51–52.  
115. Id. at 52. 
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particular circumstances will emerge from a properly executed analysis of legal 
merit. 
It has not escaped most observers that the examples Simon provides of 
contextual reasoning about legal merit seem heavily tilted toward vindicating a 
particular outcome with arguments that can be plausibly framed as legal, rather 
than as launching a searching inquiry into the ―best interpretation‖ of the 
background values immanent in the law.
116
 This point has been illustrated by the 
juxtaposition of two of Simon‘s examples.117 In one, a client on public assistance 
lives rent-free in a home owned by her cousin, which requires a reduction of the 
client‘s monthly welfare benefits by $150 because the free housing is considered 
―income in kind‖ under the applicable regulations.118 Simon argues that a lawyer 
might justifiably recommend to the client that the client make a nominal rent 
payment of five dollars per month to her cousin to avoid the force of this 
regulation, arguing that it is permissible because ―the claimant‘s interest in a 
minimally adequate income is a value of exceptional legal importance‖ reflected in 
the law.
119
 In the second example, a highly paid hotel manager lives on the hotel 
premises, and the in-kind benefit of the free housing is taxable as income.
120
 Simon 
argues that a lawyer could not properly advise the manager to take advantage of a 
tax exemption by renegotiating his contract to make living on the hotel premises a 
condition of employment. The clear purpose of the exemption, Simon explains, is 
to compensate employees who are inconvenienced by the requirement to live 
onsite, and it ―would not be consistent with this statutory purpose to apply the 
exemption to arrangements the taxpayer has initiated.‖121 
It is notable that under the dominant, or implicit operating jurisprudence 
of lawyering, either of these maneuvers would be justifiable. As long as the 
structuring maneuver is not explicitly prohibited by law, there is no basis in the 
operating jurisprudence of lawyers to criticize either as unethical. Ethical analysis 
that labels one maneuver ethical and the other unethical might be justified by 
moral or distributive justice arguments that view tax breaks for wealthy and 
powerful clients differently than legal aid to the poor. This approach is endorsed 
under moral theory by Deborah Rhode, who has argued that conventional norms of 
zealous advocacy and avoidance of regulation should continue to apply to poverty 
lawyers because ―[a]n impoverished mother struggling to escape welfare stands on 
                                                                                                                
116. Luban, Reason and Passion, supra note 43, at 888–91 (discussing the 
tenuous legal authority for the lawyer‘s resolution of legal merit in two of Simon‘s 
examples). Somewhat surprisingly, Simon‘s response to such criticism is that as long as a 
lawyer has produced an analysis that is ―consistent with a minimally plausible interpretation 
of [relevant legal] authority,‖ it ought to be counted as a judgment of legal merit rather than 
a moral judgment in disguise. Simon, supra note 98, at 999. 
117. See, e.g., William H. Simon et al., William H. Simon: Thinking Like a 
Lawyer—About Ethics, 38 DUQUESNE L. REV. 1015, 1035 (2000) (comments by Professor 
Bruce S. Ledewitz).  
118. SIMON, supra note 1, at 148. 
119. Id. at 148–49. 
120. Id. at 146. 
121. Id. at 147. 
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different ethical footing than a wealthy executive attempting to escape taxes.‖122 It 
is also endorsed by Susan Carle, who argues for the explicit recognition of the 
relative power of the clients in making ethical calls.
123
 However, Simon does not 
argue in favor of such activist interpretations of law on moral or political grounds. 
In his view, the ethical difference in the leeway afforded the lawyers to structure 
the client‘s affairs to avoid the regulatory effect of the law is driven by 
interpretation of the underlying values and principles within the law itself.
124
 
Without the premise that Dworkian interpretation yields a ―right answer‖ 
or ―best interpretation‖ of law most of the time, the implications of Simon‘s 
jurisprudence are troubling. In determining the ―bounds of the law,‖ Simon‘s 
jurisprudence eschews deference to both formal law and client interests in favor of 
lawyers‘ assessments of substantive justice in the circumstances that each case 
presents. Given the complex, contestable, and multilayered analysis that Simon‘s 
approach requires, we might expect that lawyers‘ judgments will be heavily 
freighted with the lawyers‘ personal and political beliefs about the moral 
worthiness of the client‘s claim and moral justifications for the law.125 If there 
really is a right or best interpretation of the ―bounds of the law‖ at which lawyers 
are aiming in each case, these judgments may roughly converge.
126
 However, if 
                                                                                                                
122. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 79 (2000). 
123. See generally Susan D. Carle, Power as a Factor in Lawyers’ Ethical 
Deliberation, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 115 (2006). 
124. See Simon, supra note 98, at 997–99 (defending the legality of the analysis 
in his controversial examples by arguing that a purely moral analysis would yield different 
results). 
125. As Simon acknowledged, when the definition of law is expanded beyond 
positivist criteria to incorporate analysis of the relative weight of various background values 
and principles, the question of what law prescribes becomes difficult to answer. SIMON, 
supra note 1, at 99–100. And, determining what the law prescribes is only half the game: 
lawyers also need to assess the institutional competence of relevant processes and 
institutions to arrive at reliable determinations of justice and calibrate their direct 
responsibility for ensuring just results accordingly. 
126. Even if the ―right answer‖ thesis holds, Simon‘s theory of legal ethics faces 
the critique that the complex contextual judgments it requires are too intellectually 
demanding to expect lawyers in ordinary practice to execute reliably. Luban criticized 
Simon on this point, arguing that Simon‘s theory of legal ethics requires ―excessive 
cognitive demands on lawyers‖ that are ―too strenuous for ordinary decision-making by 
ordinary lawyers.‖ Luban, Reason and Passion, supra note 43, at 896. Simon—rightly, in 
my view—rejects the charge that his contextual style of reasoning requires an unrealistically 
Herculean effort, responding that experienced practitioners already engage in sophisticated 
and complex strategic analysis, and that experience renders such judgments less daunting 
than they appear when spelled out on paper. Simon, supra note 98, at 995. Interestingly, 
Luban raised the same defense to the charge that his own theory of legal ethics, which 
requires lawyers to balance the moral justifications for zealous advocacy against the moral 
harm caused by adhering to professional role in particular cases, was too complex. See 
LUBAN, supra note 19, at 140–41. In my view, Simon and Luban are each correct in noting 
that expert judgment looks more complicated when its various steps and multiple factors are 
spelled out in writing than it is in actual implementation, where the steps of reasoning and 
factors of analysis are incorporated into the schemas on which experts implicitly rely in 
processing information. 
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there is not, Simon‘s jurisprudence of lawyering provides substantial leeway for 
lawyers to exercise private and unreviewable judgment about the merits of 
substantive justice, and to do so under the imprimatur of legal expertise.  
To the extent that the law leaves room for genuine disagreement about the 
merits of substantive justice—in what I have elsewhere called the ―challenge of 
moral pluralism‖127—Simon‘s approach is troubling from the perspective of both 
clients and the public. Consider an example I have posed elsewhere, of a lawyer 
advising a lesbian couple about how to structure their family affairs to raise a child 
together.
128
 The legal landscape in which the lawyer operates in the ―lesbian family 
planning‖ example might well include a narrowly worded statute that explicitly 
limits co-adoption to married couples in a state that prohibits same-sex marriage, 
making co-adoption technically impossible for same-sex couples.
129
 However, a 
creative interpretation of the statute might permit same-sex adoption based on a 
broader provision in the family code stating that family law statutes ought 
generally to be construed to protect the ―best interests‖ of children.130 The problem 
with Simon‘s approach in such a legal landscape is that family law is not univocal: 
its strands of family privacy, individual autonomy, and parens patriae intervention 
on behalf of children are woven together by underlying principles that value both 
religious traditionalism and liberal individualism.
131
 As a result, a lesbian-friendly 
lawyer would be inclined to view the statutory language explicitly confining co-
adoption to married couples as inappropriately narrow and outmoded and to read 
the underlying principles and values in family law as supportive of the rights and 
liberties of same-sex couples to establish equal parentage of a child they intend to 
raise together.
132
 A lawyer who believes that homosexuality is immoral and that 
raising children in same-sex relationships undermines the important social 
institution of the family would interpret the underlying principles and values 
inherent in family law differently. Such a lawyer would read the statutory 
provisions limiting co-adoption to married heterosexual couples as an expression 
of society‘s deeply held faith in the sanctity of marriage and would view attempts 
to use a ―best interests of the child‖ provision to extend co-adoption to same-sex 
families as manipulative and corruptive of the law‘s underlying values and 
principles.
133
 
Under Simon‘s jurisprudence of lawyering, the couple‘s luck would be in 
the draw. The lawyer‘s public responsibility would be to get the interpretation 
right, not according to their own conception of right and wrong, but according to a 
broadly defined conception of legal merit. Simon‘s jurisprudence would direct 
each lawyer to interpret the law in the way that seemed to best fit with law‘s 
underlying principles and values, without any particular deference to explicit 
                                                                                                                
127. See generally Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers, Justice, and the Challenge of 
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129. Id. at 410–11. 
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language in the statute that ran contrary to those purposes and without an anchor in 
the client‘s interests. Lawyers with different views of the priority of competing 
underlying values might well come to different conclusions about the right or best 
interpretation of governing law, and do so in good faith. But, unlike Dworkian 
judges, whose decisions about which interpretations best fit and justify the law are 
disciplined by exposure to adversary advocacy and public scrutiny, lawyers‘ 
judgments about the best interpretation of law would be shielded from public 
review and cloaked in a mantle of legal expertise that their clients might well lack 
the professional education and training to challenge or second-guess.
134
 
The competing jurisprudential camp that has emerged within legal ethics 
explicitly takes moral pluralism into account, beginning with the premise that 
society is characterized by such a deep and irreconcilable moral pluralism that the 
Dworkian ideal of integrating the underlying principles of law into a coherent 
narrative is unattainable and Simon‘s jurisprudence of lawyering is unworkable.135 
The next section examines how that premise leads to the positivist school of 
thought within the emerging jurisprudence of lawyering. 
B. Moral Pluralism and Positivism for Lawyers 
Legal scholar Brad Wendel and philosopher Tim Dare have each 
advanced a positivist jurisprudence of lawyering derived from a professional duty 
to respect the authority of law as a framework for enabling coordinated social 
activity in the face of deep and persistent normative disagreement in a morally 
pluralistic society.
136
 According to the premise of moral pluralism that forms the 
foundation for the positivist jurisprudence in legal ethics, people in society share 
an interest in creating a stable framework to enable cooperative activity despite 
their deep and persistent normative disagreement.
137
 However, because society is 
characterized by a diversity of comprehensive moral viewpoints and empirical 
disagreement about how to implement even widely shared norms in concrete 
situations,
138
 society is ―unable to establish a stable basis for cooperative activity 
with reference to comprehensive doctrines of the good, or substantive theories of 
rights.‖139 According to the positivist theorists in legal ethics, the primary function 
of law is to resolve and supersede this normative controversy.
140
 Law achieves the 
goals of settlement, stability, and coordination by providing neutral lawmaking 
procedures that ―transform brute demands into claims of [legal] entitlement.‖141 By 
accepting the authority of neutral lawmaking procedures, persons who hold 
                                                                                                                
134. Id. at 426–33. Shaffer and Cochran raise a similar concern, criticizing 
Simon‘s theory for putting lawyers in the role of a ―guru.‖ SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 
68, at 40–41. 
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divergent views on justice and morality can coordinate their activities through 
mutual respect for law ―without abandoning their own views or embracing the 
views of others.‖142 
The legal ethicists who accept the premises of moral pluralism argue that 
the conception of law that best serves the coordinating function demanded by 
moral pluralism is ―broadly positivist‖ in insisting on the separability of legality 
from morality.
143
 Under a moral pluralist view, citizens will never reach full—
maybe not even approximate—agreement on substantive questions of justice.144 
Law‘s authority can be established only if it can be derived in a way that retains its 
independence from the normative claims it is meant to settle.
145
 Positivist 
conceptions of law make such settlement possible because they allow citizens to 
transcend underlying contests over notions of justice or morality by appealing to 
shared understandings of legality. As Tim Dare explains, the authority of law is 
analogous to the authority of a coin toss in providing ―a way of going on, of 
deciding what to do, despite our disagreement as to what ought to be done.‖146 
After the coin toss, the loser has an authoritative reason to set aside substantive 
disagreement with the result and accept it as the outcome of a decision procedure 
to which the parties agreed.
147
 Analogously, the fact that something has been 
enacted as law is said to provide a sufficient and exclusionary reason for citizens to 
obey the authority of law, which supplants any reasoning about contested 
underlying policies that led up to the enactment of law.
148
 
Wendel makes a different argument about the authority of law, 
contrasting the coin toss example with his own elaboration of Joseph Raz‘s 
example of binding arbitration.
149
 Wendel asks us to imagine a dispute between a 
manufacturer and distributor of machine parts: the manufacturer believes the 
distributor has misappropriated trade secrets and is using those secrets to sell its 
own line of products in violation of the parties‘ distribution agreement; the 
distributor believes that the technology at issue is not a trade secret, that the side 
distribution is not in violation of the parties‘ agreement, and that the manufacturer 
is tortiously interfering with his business dealings.
150
 After disputing ―the right 
way to interpret the contract and the applicable law,‖ the parties are at an impasse, 
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OF FREEDOM 41–42 (1986). The coin toss differs from binding arbitration by producing an 
authoritative reason for action that is independent of the underlying reasons. 
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but want to preserve their mutually beneficial commercial relationship, so they 
agree to submit their dispute to binding arbitration and to abide by the result.
151
 
Like the coin toss, the arbitrator‘s decision provides an authoritative reason to set 
aside their underlying controversy and continue to do business, even for the losing 
party who disagrees with the result of the arbitration. Unlike the coin toss, which is 
independent of the underlying issues, the arbitrator‘s decision is based on a 
balancing and resolution of the competing reasons in favor of one or the other of 
the parties.
152
 
Law, Wendel argues, is more like the decision of the arbitrator than the 
coin toss because its settlement is derived from a lawmaking process in which the 
parties‘ competing viewpoints have been heard and taken into account. Moreover, 
according to Wendel, the legitimacy of law does not rest solely on the fact that law 
has achieved an authoritative settlement of normative controversy in society; it 
also rests on the fairness of the procedures through which the settlement has been 
achieved.
153
 Normative controversy in society can be settled by installing a 
dictator, he points out, but installing a dictator is a normatively unattractive way to 
reach a settlement because it does not respect the equality and political liberty of 
citizens.
154
 The normative appeal of democracy is that its lawmaking processes 
provide a procedure for resolving normative controversy that ―treat[s] citizens as 
equals, entitled to an equal measure of respect no matter what their substantive 
views about justice and morality.‖155 Lawyers‘ duties of fidelity to law arise out of 
respect for the values of equality and dignity reflected in the settlement of 
controversy through a democratic lawmaking process that ―give[s] an equal voice 
to participants in a political debate, so that the resulting legal settlement reflects 
the view[s] of everyone, as much as possible.‖156 
When translated into a theory of legal ethics, the positivist jurisprudence 
of lawyering has two ramifications for legal advice and counseling. First, lawyers 
have a professional duty not to toy with society‘s settlement of normative 
controversy by playing interpretive games with the law. Fidelity to law demands 
that lawyers interpret the law ―in good faith with due regard to its meaning‖ rather 
than ―as an obstacle standing in the way of the client‘s goals.‖157 ―The law is 
purposive; it is about something,‖ Wendel explains, and good faith interpretation 
from an internal point of view ―is aimed at recovering that meaning.‖158 Rather 
than zealously pursuing a client‘s interests within any arguable interpretation of 
law, Wendel argues that lawyers‘ partisanship should be limited to the pursuit of a 
client‘s legal entitlements,159 defined as ―what the law, properly interpreted, 
actually provides.‖160 As Tim Dare similarly puts it, partisanship requires only 
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―merely-zealous‖ representation that pursues a client‘s legal entitlements, rather 
―hyper-zealous‖ representation, in which lawyers ―pursue any advantage attainable 
for their client[s] through the law.‖161 
Second, respect for the authority of law commits lawyers to pursuing their 
clients‘ legal entitlements regardless of their own moral agreement or 
disagreement with their clients‘ aims. For law to settle normative controversy, 
moral considerations must be separated from the determination of law and external 
to the professional role of lawyers.
162
 Lawyers who re-introduce moral 
considerations into their interpretations of the ―bounds of the law‖ actively 
―undercut the procedures which allow the advocates of a plurality of views to live 
together in communities.‖163 Moreover, to the extent that law incorporates moral 
standards, lawyers should look not to their own resolution of the incorporated 
moral standards, but to the beliefs of the legal officials who are likely to apply the 
law.
164
 
As with Simon‘s Dworkian jurisprudence of lawyering, the capacity of 
the positivist theories of lawyering to deliver on the promises legal ethics makes to 
clients and to the public rides in part on its capacity to deliver clear and 
determinative answers to interpretive questions. There are significant differences 
between the nature of a coin toss or binding arbitration in settling a private dispute 
and the nature of law in settling normative controversy in a morally pluralistic 
society. In the consensual coin toss and binding arbitration examples from which 
Wendel and Dare generalize respect for the authority of law, the parties have 
endorsed the decision procedure in advance and agreed to submit their dispute to 
that procedure for resolution. Moreover, these procedures produce a clear result—a 
coin toss comes up either heads or tails—without further dispute about what the 
result means. Law‘s capacity to deliver such clear results is debatable. Even in 
Wendel‘s binding arbitration example, which does not implicate a particularly 
deep normative controversy in society, the law is open to multiple interpretations, 
and it is the arbitrator who provides the authoritative interpretation that allows the 
parties to move forward. 
Wendel recognizes that law‘s indeterminacy poses a challenge to the 
premise that law can successfully settle normative controversy in a morally 
pluralistic society.
165
 He concedes that it is most often not possible to ―read the 
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meaning of the law directly from legal texts‖ and that the client‘s legal 
entitlements are therefore not always clear.
166
 However, Wendel insists that 
interpreting the law respectfully with due regard for its intended meaning is not a 
wholly subjective enterprise; it is an exercise of professional judgment susceptible 
to criticism based on ―intersubjective criteria‖ of validity.167 These criteria are built 
on social practices that differentiate legal from non-legal reasons and plausible 
from implausible interpretations of law.
168
 Interpretations of the ―bounds of the 
law‖ that would not pass muster within interpretive communities ―comprised of 
judges, lawyers, scholars, and interested citizens who have learned to differentiate 
between legal and non-legal reasons‖169 cannot be said to constitute ―legal‖ advice 
because they violate the implicit ―rules of recognition‖ that arise from the social 
practices of lawyers.
170
 
According to Wendel, the positivist jurisprudence of lawyering rules out 
some of the most extreme interpretations of law deployed by Enron lawyers in 
structuring their client‘s financial transactions and by Office of Legal Counsel 
lawyers advising the Bush administration on the laws prohibiting torture of enemy 
combatants in United States custody.
171
 However, the moderate indeterminacy that 
fidelity to law leaves behind still allows lawyers to choose from the range of 
multiple plausible interpretations that remain.
172
 Within this range of plausible 
interpretations, the positivist jurisprudential theories look to the underlying 
function of law in settling normative controversy in society to guide lawyers‘ 
interpretive practices. Lawyers, Wendel argues, should ―understand their role in 
the process of legal interpretation as coordination-enhancing.‖173 
While recognizing that fidelity to law is ―a complex political value, 
including ideals of both stability and flexibility,‖174 Wendel consistently leans in 
the direction of upholding the stabilizing function of law. Wendel firmly insists 
that lawyers owe fidelity to laws despite lawmaking processes admittedly skewed 
by existing disparities in power, wealth, and social influence that fall far short of 
the ideal of equal participation.
175
 He explicitly rules out lawyers‘ covert 
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nullification or subversion of laws they deem unjust or outmoded through 
strategies like selective ignorance of damaging facts or the creative structuring of 
client affairs, reflected in the welfare avoidance examples endorsed (for different 
reasons) by Simon and Rhode.
176
 Although there may be a theoretical basis for 
avoiding the effect of laws enacted by unfair processes, Wendel argues that it is 
necessary to ―set the threshold very high for a finding of unfairness‖ because 
citizens in a morally pluralistic society are likely to have competing notions of 
fairness, and to base the professional duty of fidelity to law on a thick notion of 
procedural fairness in lawmaking would re-mire society in the very type of 
normative controversy from which law is supposed to extract it.
177
 It was 
justifications of exactly this type, he cautions, that fueled the Enron lawyers, 
whose clients ―believed, in sincere subjective good faith, that their company‘s 
business model was so game-changing that it had simply outpaced legal regulation, 
and that fidelity to anachronistic laws would only hamper necessary innovation in 
dynamic markets.‖178 
The view of moral conflict in the positivist jurisprudential theories of 
lawyering—that moral conflict is a problem that law needs to overcome through 
settlement—may be criticized for undervaluing the need for flexibility and 
openness in a morally pluralistic society. Isaiah Berlin, one of the most prominent 
political philosophers to endorse a premise of moral pluralism, wrote quite 
differently about the ideal to which morally pluralistic societies should aspire: that 
it should be the aim of decent societies ―to promot[e] and preserv[e] an uneasy 
equilibrium which is constantly threatened and in constant need of repair.‖179 In 
the face of moral pluralism, one might hope for a society that takes this vision 
more seriously by alternatively aiming to unsettle majoritarian control as well as to 
stabilize it. The emphasis that the positivist jurisprudence of lawyering places on 
stability and coordination leaves little space for clients to create Berlin‘s ―uneasy 
equilibrium‖ by structuring their private affairs in ways that resist or avoid unfair 
laws and by unsettling the authority of law by creating a web of social practices 
that are increasingly distant from formal legal requirements. 
                                                                                                                
into effective coalitions; differentials in wealth and power are reinforced 
by structural features such as inequality in primary and secondary 
education and the practical inaccessibility to middle-income families of 
elite higher-education institutions; women, people of color, sexual 
minorities, and people with disabilities face persistent discrimination, 
both explicit and tacit, which reinforces inequality in the political, 
economic, and social realms; and for the poorest and most disempowered 
citizens, the state is not perceived as a means of engagement at all, but as 
an alien force they experience, if at all, through intrusive policing and 
bureaucratic indifference. 
Id. at 91. 
176. Id. at 134. For discussion of the welfare avoidance examples, see supra notes 
118–24 and accompanying text. 
177. WENDEL, supra note 1, at 102. 
178. Id. at 134–35. 
179. ISAIAH BERLIN, The Pursuit of the Ideal, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF 
HUMANITY 1, 19 (1990). 
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The commitment to the overriding importance of law‘s stability and 
settlement function leads Wendel to the conclusion that ―moderately fair‖ legal 
systems must in the end simply tolerate the ―localized injustice‖ suffered by 
discrete groups, such as sexual minority groups who ―believe that the political 
process has been captured by citizens whose irrational bigotry renders them unable 
to decide fairly on matters of concern to these groups, such as same-sex marriage 
and same-sex-partner adoption rights.‖180 If a law is unjust, he argues, lawyers 
must either support it or seek to challenge it directly through public modes of law 
reform, lest they damage or undermine the very framework of law that makes legal 
strategies of reform possible through disrespectful non-compliance.
181
 Wendel 
admits with an air of resignation that the low threshold he sets for fidelity to law 
enacted with ―rough equality and tolerably fair procedures‖182 provides ―a thin 
basis for solidarity, but it is likely the best we can do.‖183 The need to settle 
controversy is pressing, the resources for reaching a settlement are limited, and 
―[a]t some point the majority is entitled to say, ‗we have heard enough,‘ and move 
on.‖184 
III. SHIFTING THE PARADIGM: 
TOWARD A CLIENT-CENTERED JURISPRUDENCE OF LAWYERING  
The emerging jurisprudence of lawyering proposes new and refreshing 
answers to the ethical problems created when lawyers pursue their clients‘ 
objectives within the bounds of the law, while at the same time interpreting the 
bounds of the law instrumentally as a cost or interference to be avoided or 
structured around. As Part I explained, the implicit operating jurisprudence 
criticized in legal ethics is based on legal realist conceptions of law, which ignore 
constraints that might arise from law‘s underlying purpose and strip law of its 
normative content. The moral theories in legal ethics took this instrumental 
interpretive stance as a set feature of legal representation and sought to mitigate its 
deleterious effects by incorporating ordinary moral responsibilities into lawyers‘ 
professional duties—responsibilities that encouraged lawyers to engage in 
instructional moral counseling designed to bring the pursuit of their clients‘ private 
goals into line with the public good. However, the moral theory approach threatens 
to undermine rule-of-law values, strains against the role that lawyers play as client 
agents and fiduciaries, and is questionable in terms of its public benefit, both 
because lawyers have no special expertise in moral reasoning vis-à-vis their clients 
and because the structural constraints of practice are likely to make such moral 
advice ineffectual in the situations where it is most needed. 
As Part II demonstrated, the jurisprudential theories in legal ethics take an 
alternative route of defining the task of lawyers‘ interpretations of the ―bounds of 
the law‖ to encompass public duties of correct or good faith interpretation of 
law.
185
 As Part II argued, the conceptions of law that set the standard for correct or 
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good faith interpretation depend for their legitimacy on the fulfillment of certain 
conditions, and it is questionable whether law has the capacity to deliver what 
these jurisprudential theories demand. For example, the Dworkian model of 
adjudication built into Simon‘s contextual theory of legal ethics conceives of law 
according to its correspondence with principles of substantive justice that can be 
derived from the underlying values and principles in the law. Its success depends 
on the capacity of law to deliver right answers to these questions of fit and 
justification. The positivist jurisprudence on which Wendel and Dare stake their 
theories of legal ethics depend on the capacity of law to transcend normative 
controversy in society through shared understandings of legality. 
In this Part, I question the underlying framework within which the 
emerging jurisprudential theories in legal ethics are based, using Ted Schneyer‘s 
work in legal ethics as a guide. I argue that, even if law has the capacities these 
jurisprudential theories claim—to correspond with substantive justice or to settle 
normative controversy in society—their jurisprudential successes cannot be 
achieved by delegating authoritative interpretation of law to lawyers. Yet, this is 
exactly what the emerging theories in the jurisprudence of lawyering do. Both 
Simon‘s Dworkian jurisprudence and the positivist jurisprudence define lawyers‘ 
primary duties in terms of public goods: substantive justice or legal entitlement. In 
the emerging theories, the lawyers owe primary fidelity to the law and only 
secondary duties to their clients. In the emerging jurisprudence of legal ethics, 
lawyers stand between the law and their clients and have direct responsibility for 
achieving law‘s aims through the interpretations of the ―bounds of the law‖ that 
they provide to their clients, case-by-case and controversy-by-controversy. 
Ted Schneyer has long noted the perils and problems of assigning 
primary responsibility to lawyers for carrying out public duties, and his work 
provides a template of considerations that those embarking on a jurisprudence of 
lawyering ought to take into account.
186
 Schneyer‘s arguments in favor of the 
primacy of client-centered duties in legal ethics are based in important part on the 
capacity of client-centered legal ethics to hold lawyers accountable to something 
beyond their own interests.
187
 One of Schneyer‘s early and groundbreaking 
critiques of theoretical legal ethics was that the solutions proposed by moral 
theorists were aimed at the wrong target: he argued that much of the apparently 
excessively client-regarding behavior at the center of concern about legal 
professionalism could be more easily explained in terms of the coincidence of 
zealous advocacy with lawyers‘ pursuit of their own financial, reputational, and 
professional interests.
188
 The problem with holding lawyers primarily accountable 
to public values, Schneyer argues, is that the lack of widespread public consensus 
on what counts as morally right or substantively just makes adherence to those 
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norms difficult to enforce.
189
 A client-centered role morality protects clients 
against lawyer self-dealing and ―guards against the risk that [lawyers], biased by 
strong financial pressures or personal bonds and unconstrained by role, would 
misapply their own conceptions of justice or all-things-considered morality.‖190 
To be fair, Schneyer directs his criticisms of professionalizing public 
duties against the moral theorists in legal ethics, noting that jurisprudential theory 
at least ―tries to grapple with the complexities‖ of defining justice with reference 
to a jurisprudentially grounded conception of law.
191
 However, Schneyer‘s oft-
repeated cautions about lawyer accountability and the risks of lawyer self-dealing 
ought to concern us in the emerging jurisprudence of lawyering as well. Because 
the interpretation of the ―bounds of the law‖ is a task grounded in lawyers‘ 
expertise rather than their personal moral judgments, it has the benefit of 
disciplining lawyers to look beyond their personal or political views in deciding 
the limits of their representation. Yet in carrying out the interpretive task, lawyers 
must exercise judgment about how to implement the public duties that the 
jurisprudence of lawyering assigns directly to them. To the extent that the law is 
indeterminate, lawyers‘ judgments about its underlying purpose pose some of the 
same risks that the moral theories in legal ethics face: that lawyers will 
inappropriately impose their own views on their clients rather than acting as their 
clients‘ agents; and that their private and unreviewable interpretations of the 
―bounds of the law‖ in their clients‘ cases will undermine rule-of-law values. 
Additionally, the dangers of lawyer overreaching within the lawyer–client 
relationship are greater when the lawyer communicates a limitation on legal 
representation in terms of the ―bounds of the law‖ than they are when the lawyer 
offers a moral opinion or advice that a client feels more free to accept or reject on 
the basis of the client‘s own moral agreement or disagreement with the lawyer‘s 
view. 
Schneyer‘s concern about the risks of lawyer overreaching and self-
dealing has always been tempered by an optimistic realism about the potential for 
lawyers to engage in professional self-correction through appropriately structured 
self-regulation. In a field where cynicism about the decline of the legal profession 
is rife, Ted Schneyer has always had faith: in lawyers, in traditional client-centered 
lawyering, and in the legal profession. His archival study of the bar politics in the 
creation of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct rejected simplistic 
accounts of lawyer self-regulation either as ―a collective effort to aggrandize 
lawyers at their clients‘ expense,‖192 or as ―a public relations charade that would 
legitimate the bar‘s tradition of self-regulation but have no regulatory bite.‖193 
Rather, he revealed the interplay of complex and shifting alliances among different 
sectors of the bar and a sensitivity to both public and academic criticism of the 
legal profession. Schneyer‘s groundbreaking work on law firm discipline similarly 
emphasizes both optimism about the potential for law firms to develop 
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infrastructures to support and patrol the ethical quality of their legal representation, 
and the need for bar agencies to hold firms ethically accountable for doing so.
194
 
My own work in legal ethics both mirrors and elaborates these themes in 
Schneyer‘s work. Like Schneyer, I am skeptical about the standard legal ethics 
diagnosis of the problem of professionalism as stemming from lawyers‘ strict 
adherence to partisan professional norms.
195
 Although lawyers sometimes invoke 
zealous partisanship as an excuse to justify tactics that coincide with their own 
financial or reputational interests, I share Schneyer‘s faith that client-centered 
professional norms need not demand such tactics, and attempts to curb excessive 
zeal need not do away with the primary commitment of lawyers to their clients. As 
Schneyer has written, ―Nothing about a properly reconstructed hired-gun ethic 
stands in the way of a lawyer‘s (1) considering solutions that can accommodate the 
interests of adversaries, (2) proposing such solutions to clients, and (3) helping 
clients see that those solutions are also in their own interests.‖196 And, he argued, 
―[i]f lawyers can be trained to understand this, then how much about hired-gun 
ethics is there left to fear?‖197  
The engaged client-centered theory of the lawyer–client relationship that I 
am developing has focused so far on defining the duty of partisanship to include a 
responsibility to shape legal representation around a more robust understanding of 
client objectives grounded in the client‘s values as well as their legal interests.198 It 
can be seen as an alternative response to one of the more troubling problems 
associated with the legal realist conception of law: the prospect that lawyers‘ 
preoccupation with their clients‘ legal rights and interests distorts their 
perspectives on their clients‘ objectives.199 I have argued that when clients seek 
legal representation, their legal interests are most often entangled with other 
projects, commitments, and relationships with others, all of which are natural 
sources of normative constraint on a client‘s objectives.200 Lawyers provide expert 
legal advice by sorting the facts of the client‘s situation into a series of legal 
categories: claims, defenses, procedures, evidence. As their clients‘ legal rights 
and interests come more sharply into focus, other non-legal concerns—clients‘ 
relationships with others, reputation and standing in the community, values and 
commitments that clients want to honor—can fade into the background. As a 
result, lawyers may come to over-value the client‘s legal rights and interests 
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relative to the weight that the client might assign to the protection of those rights 
and interests when the client compares them to the other things that the client 
values. The solution to this problem is not to turn over moral control of the 
representation to the lawyer; it is to get lawyers to bring their clients‘ other 
interests and concerns back into the picture so that legal representation can be 
directed toward objectives that put the pursuit of legal interests into the context of 
the other values, relationships, and concerns that are important to clients. 
This kind of solution was a central focus of client-centered theories of 
lawyering that grew out of clinical legal scholarship in the 1970s and 1980s.
201
 
Client-centered representation responded to the problem of legal objectification 
through a combination of strategies designed to increase lawyers‘ attention to the 
interrelationship between a client‘s legal and non-legal concerns and to re-
configure authority and expertise in the lawyer–client relationship in ways that 
recognized a broader and more participatory role for clients in legal 
representation.
202
 The foundation for client-centered representation is a 
conceptualization of legal representation as problem-solving that puts the client—
rather than the client‘s legal issues—at the center of legal representation.203 When 
legal representation is conceptualized as problem-solving, the non-legal aspects of 
a client‘s problem or situation—the economic, social, psychological, political, 
moral, and religious considerations—play a more prominent role. Because the 
client has better access to information about the relative weight and importance of 
these considerations, as well as a better sense of how choosing different legal 
alternatives will affect these non-legal values, the client is seen as better situated 
than the lawyer to make many of the decisions related to representation.
204
 
Client-centered representation initially relied heavily on the idea that 
lawyers and clients occupy separate spheres of expertise and the client-centered 
approach articulated methods of interviewing and counseling based largely on 
lawyer neutrality and non-interference into client decisionmaking.
205
 However, 
client-centered representation has matured well beyond that conception. 
Sophisticated conceptions of client-centered representation now include ideals of 
holistic representation, cross-cultural competence, problem-solving lawyering, 
lawyering as empowerment, and lawyering for social change, which blur the 
boundaries between lawyer and client expertise about law and legal strategies and 
promote more collaborative and interdisciplinary methods of lawyering.
206
 In these 
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―engaged client-centered‖ practices, lawyers become more actively involved in 
helping clients articulate their objectives, offer advice based on the lawyers‘ best 
understanding of the clients‘ values, and involve clients in decisions and strategies 
that might traditionally be thought to fall within lawyers‘ expertise and 
decisionmaking authority with legal representation.
207
 
Client-centered representation is theoretically grounded in respect for 
client autonomy.
208
 Autonomy tends to get a bad name in legal ethics because it is 
equated with permitting clients to do whatever they want to do without either 
guidance or self-restraint.
209
 Generally, the foundation offered for a client-
autonomy-based theory of legal ethics is a libertarian argument that citizens are 
entitled to be free from state interference with minimal deference to society‘s need 
to accomplish basic coordinating goals, sometimes supplemented with 
consequentialist arguments that providing individuals with maximum freedom 
achieves justice.
210
 The repudiation of these arguments has been powerfully stated 
by the leading thinkers within legal ethics. David Luban has systematically 
critiqued arguments that the lawyers‘ partisan role in an adversary system is the 
best way to determine truth, to protect legal rights, or to reflect society‘s 
commitment to enhancing personal autonomy and protecting human dignity.
211
 
Lawyers, he asserted, invoke such arguments as an ―adversary system excuse‖ to 
justify instrumental manipulation of the law and legal process to maximize their 
clients‘ legal interests. William Simon similarly critiqued the ―ideology of 
advocacy‖ as an incoherent and internally inconsistent theoretical basis for the 
neutral partisan advocacy deemed necessary to the functioning of the legal 
system.
212
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However, these critiques of client autonomy rely—either explicitly or 
implicitly—on the image of clients as Holmesian ―bad men‖ bent on maximizing 
their freedom from state interference, and a view of autonomy that emphasizes the 
concept of ―negative liberty,‖ or the freedom to be left alone.213 They tend to 
overlook conceptions of autonomy grounded in the ―positive liberty‖ to live one‘s 
life according to values that one has chosen and affirmed over time.
214
 When we 
shift our view of autonomy to encompass conceptions of ―positive liberty,‖ a 
different picture of the connections between enhancing autonomy and achieving 
justice emerges. Positive liberty is based in notions of self-actualization, or as 
Joseph Raz has put it, the ability to be the author of one‘s own life.215 The 
conditions of an autonomous life under this view are not reducible to separation 
from others and independence from external constraint, but are based in creative 
and constructive engagement in projects, commitments, relationships, and 
endeavors.
216
 The richer conception of positive freedom helps to justify and inform 
practices of engaged client-centered lawyering within the basic framework of 
enhancing and supporting client autonomy.
217
 
However, appeals to client autonomy alone cannot support a full-blown 
theory of legal ethics, because theories of legal ethics require a balancing of duties 
that lawyers owe to clients and to the public. Theories of client autonomy can do 
much to elucidate client-centered theories of how engaged lawyers should be in 
helping clients clarify and define their objectives without making Holmesian ―bad 
man‖ assumptions that clients are primarily self-interested. They can even 
encompass the notion that enhancing a client‘s autonomy may include helping 
clients who value obedience to law to meet that objective. But a full-blown theory 
of lawyering would require more. It would require an account of the relationship 
between enhancing client autonomy and the function of law in society, and a 
jurisprudence of lawyering that explains how in enhancing their clients‘ autonomy, 
lawyers contribute to the functioning of law. 
It is possible to sketch out a different understanding of the traditional 
client-centered role of lawyers within the legal system based on this conception of 
autonomy as positive—or self-creative—liberty. In such a view, the function of 
law in promoting autonomy is not based merely on leaving citizens alone but on 
creating conditions in which they can actualize their values by supporting their 
creative endeavors and helping them structure their commitments within 
productive relationships and supportive communities. The qualities of law that 
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create these conditions are not limited to maintaining social stability but include 
flexibility and responsiveness to the needs of citizens to access legal structures for 
a variety of diverse projects and in the context of multiple and shifting sub-
communities and counter-cultures in which these diverse projects are rooted and 
sustained. Lawyers‘ partisan duties to clients and their duties to the legal system 
can be harmonized within this vision through the idea that lawyers‘ partisan 
representation of clients helps create space within and around the law for clients to 
experiment with and test the legitimacy of the norms enacted into law, so that 
individuals can both pursue the projects that will enable them to lead autonomous 
lives, and so that law can adjust itself to the needs of its citizenry. Rather than 
seeing partisan representation as the cynical manipulation of law to maximize 
clients‘ interests, it could be viewed as a creative attempt to legitimate the client‘s 
values by connecting them to values reflected in the law; or to challenge the law 
by surfacing divergence between the clients‘ values and values reflected in law. 
Existing strands of thought within legal ethics, social science, and 
political theory support this vision of the lawyers‘ role. Within legal ethics, Daniel 
Markovits has argued that lawyers play ―critical roles in sustaining the legitimacy‖ 
of legal frameworks in the litigation context by ―bringing the law‘s doctrinal 
categories and the concerns of clients into equilibrium.‖218 Markovits draws in part 
on a vast body of ―law and society‖ literature to argue that when lawyers engage 
clients about how their projects, aims, and values fit within the law, it transforms 
the way clients view their demands by restating them as legal claims that stand in 
relationship to the claims and interests of others in society.
219
 Such empirical 
analysis reveals the complex ways in which law both influences, and is influenced 
by, social norms.
220
 These interactions can be seen as a sort of proving ground in 
which the legitimacy of law is tested through acts of compliance, resistance, and 
creative reinterpretation that extend well beyond the formal structures of 
adjudicative and administrative interpretation. Moreover, as noted above, there is 
support in political theory for the view that morally pluralistic democratic societies 
ought to allow citizens informal spaces within which to contest and unsettle the 
law, as well as to use law to coordinate social activity in the face of normative 
controversy.
221
 
The jurisprudential role to which lawyers would be assigned in this vision 
is a familiar one: client-centered agents charged with using their legal expertise to 
help their clients make informed decisions about law compliance and law 
avoidance. Lawyers‘ judgments about how to characterize the law to their clients 
would be informed by their role in facilitating interaction between the norms 
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inherent in the law and their clients‘ values, rather than providing bare legal 
conclusions that give clients a ―bottom line‖ assessment of what the law permits or 
prohibits in the clients‘ circumstances. This facilitative role does not assume that 
enforcement is clients‘ only concern; it favors providing clients with information 
about law‘s purposes as a way to invite clients to accept (or reject) law as a 
normative guide to their behavior. Lawyers in a facilitative role would educate 
their clients by communicating the law in the context of a sympathetic version of 
the purposes that law is meant to fulfill. Such ―full picture‖ counseling about the 
law positions clients to make informed decisions about compliance with—or 
avoidance of—law‘s dictates based on clients‘ assessments of whether the law, 
understood within the context of its regulatory purposes, is worthy of their 
respect.
222
 
I have recently explored such an approach as a critical issue in legal 
interviewing and counseling by analyzing the ethical and jurisprudential issues that 
arise in lawyer–client dialogue between a prison inmate client with a child support 
debt and his legal services lawyer.
223
 In this fictitious interview, the client begins 
by raising a concern about notices he is receiving in prison from the child support 
enforcement office, which show his child support debt continuing to rise despite 
his inability to earn money in prison.
224
 The lawyer explains the basic doctrines of 
child support law to him, offering a ―decidedly sympathetic‖ account of the 
purposes behind child support law, which help the client connect the purposes 
inherent in the law to his own values and desire to support his daughter.
225
 The 
lawyer‘s explanation of the purposes behind the rule that imputes income to child 
support obligors based on their earning potential despite their actual earnings 
surfaces a divergence between the client‘s situation and the situation that the 
imputed income standard is meant to address.
226
 The lawyer explores this gap by 
reference to a paradigmatic example of a hypothetical highly paid doctor who 
voluntarily foregoes his income to follow his dream of being a street artist, 
contrasting the hypothetical doctor with the client who lacks the ability to respond 
to the incentive created by the law by getting a job that would actualize his earning 
potential.
227
 I used this example to illustrate that when lawyers explain the reasons 
―that best justify the law governing their clients‘ situations‖—exemplified in this 
case by the reasons why the law would imputed income to the hypothetical 
doctor—they ―invite their clients to assess the validity of those reasons‖ and to 
either ―see the law as a reasonable constraint on their behavior‖ or ―decide that the 
law deserves little respect other than the fear of its enforcement.‖228 
An anecdote from my own experience on the client side of the lawyer–
client relationship also illustrates how such an approach might work in practice. In 
                                                                                                                
222. See generally, e.g., Jamie G. Heller, Legal Counseling in the Administrative 
State: How to Let the Client Decide, 103 YALE L.J. 2503 (1994).  
223. See ELLMANN ET AL., supra note 207, at 319–45 (Chapter 8, ―Talking to 
Clients About the Law‖). 
224. Id. at 320. 
225. Id. at 341–42. 
226. Id. at 342. 
227. Id. at 342–43. 
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1993, my sister Ann was hit by a car while crossing the street on an icy January 
night. The accident broke both of her legs below the knee, and while one leg 
sustained a clean break, the other required multiple surgeries and a lengthy stay in 
a nursing home. Ann is a developmentally disabled adult living independently and 
at the time of the accident was no longer covered by health insurance that had until 
recently been provided through a job. The driver of the car was an employee at a 
Perkins restaurant, who had been sent on an errand to the local supermarket when 
the restaurant‘s supply of pickles ran out. The lawyer who agreed to pursue a 
personal injury case on Ann‘s behalf was a small town Wisconsin lawyer in the 
very best sense you might imagine: smart, creative, caring, and holistic in his 
approach. 
Because Ann‘s injuries rendered her incapable of heavy physical labor 
and her cognitive disability limited her ability to do clerical and other light work, 
her lawyer suggested that she apply for social security disability benefits that 
would cover her medical and rehabilitative expenses from the date of application 
forward. Ann had a modest but significant amount of money—about $30,000—
that she had inherited from our great-uncle several years ago. Her lawyer advised 
us about how we might protect those assets from being reached and spent down 
before the benefits began to cover her hospital and nursing home expenses. He 
informed us that a ―loophole‖ in the law regarding transfers of assets would fail to 
re-capture funds that were deposited by Ann into a joint bank account and then 
withdrawn by a joint account holder. He told us that such transfers went against 
the spirit of the law, which was designed to prohibit divestment of assets prior to 
applying for government benefits, and that legislation had already been passed that 
would close the loophole. However, he told us that the legislation would not go 
into effect for several more months and that making the transfer now would not be 
technically illegal. 
Of course, this is exactly the kind of information and advice about the 
law—that the law technically allows behavior that contravenes a clear regulatory 
purpose recently reaffirmed by legislation designed to close an existing loophole—
that is at issue in the jurisprudential theories of lawyering. The result of analysis 
under the emerging jurisprudential theories has to be that Ann‘s lawyer had no 
business sharing information about how to take eleventh-hour advantage of a 
closing loophole with his clients. Personally, I am grateful that the lawyer was 
unaware of any such jurisprudential duties. 
What is most striking to me about this example from my own experience, 
however, is not the fact that the lawyer felt free to give us the advice, but the way 
he delivered it and the effect that his delivery had on our family‘s decisionmaking. 
Unlike a lawyer operating under Holmesian bad man assumptions about our 
interests and his role, the lawyer‘s advice did not come across as a professional 
assessment that we needed to protect the money by setting up a joint account and 
making the transfer.
229
 Nor did he engage in even mild forms of judgmental 
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moralizing suggested by some legal ethicists about whether taking advantage of 
the loophole would be the ―right thing‖ or a ―fair thing‖ to do.230 Instead, he gave 
us the information that he as a legal expert possessed and that we as laypersons 
lacked: that the loophole existed, that it was technically legal to make a transfer, 
and that its availability ran counter to the intended purpose of the law. This 
information enabled us to make a decision that took into account our own values 
associated with law compliance and advantage-taking, that considered how 
seriously the specific transfer in this case contravened the purposes of the law, and 
that evaluated how strongly those considerations weighed against our desire to 
protect (albeit symbolically through protection of assets) our particularly 
vulnerable family member. Without specifically engaging us in a moral dialogue, 
the way the lawyer characterized the law sparked a decisionmaking process that 
took morality into account. 
CONCLUSION 
Theorizing a workable jurisprudence of lawyering is a project that is just 
beginning to bloom in legal ethics. Springtime is a time of hope, expectation, and 
promise. This brief sketch of the contours of a client-centered jurisprudence of 
lawyering is still quite far from a fully developed theory of legal ethics. It remains 
to be seen whether a workable jurisprudence of lawyering can fulfill the Noble 
Dream of lawyers acting as intermediaries between clients and the law. Its further 
development will require careful attention to the considerations Ted Schneyer has 
provided over the years: theoretical models in legal ethics must fit plausibly within 
the profession‘s self-understanding; they must be responsive to the concern for 
lawyer self-dealing without devolving into cynicism about the potential for lawyer 
self-regulation; and they must remain attentive to the need for workable structures 
of accountability and enforcement. 
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